Showing posts with label Indian Economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indian Economy. Show all posts

Saturday, 9 April 2016

The Bengal Famine

The Bengal Famine: How the British engineered the worst genocide in human history for profit.
RAKHI CHAKRABORTY  15 AUGUST 2014

“I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion. The famine was their own fault for breeding like rabbits.” -Winston Churchill

The British had a ruthless economic agenda when it came to operating in India and that did not include empathy for native citizens. 

Under the British Raj, India suffered countless famines. But the worst hit was Bengal. 

The first of these was in 1770, followed by severe ones in 1783, 1866, 1873, 1892, 1897 and lastly 1943-44. 

Previously, when famines had hit the country, indigenous rulers were quick with useful responses to avert major disasters. 

After the advent of the British, most of the famines were a consequence of monsoonal delays along with the exploitation of the country’s natural resources by the British for their own financial gain. Yet they did little to acknowledge the havoc these actions wrought. If anything, they were irritated at the inconveniences in taxing the famines brought about.

The first of these famines was in 1770 and was ghastly brutal. The first signs indicating the coming of such a huge famine manifested in 1769 and the famine itself went on till 1773. 

It killed approximately 10 million people, millions more than the Jews incarcerated during the Second World War. It wiped out one third the population of Bengal. 

John Fiske, in his book “The Unseen World”, wrote that the famine of 1770 in Bengal was far deadlier than the Black Plague that terrorized Europe in the fourteenth century. 

Under the Mughal rule, peasants were required to pay a tribute of 10-15 per cent of their cash harvest. This ensured a comfortable treasury for the rulers and a wide net of safety for the peasants in case the weather did not hold for future harvests. 

In 1765 the Treaty of Allahabad was signed and East India Company took over the task of collecting the tributes from the then Mughal emperor Shah Alam II. 

Overnight the tributes, the British insisted on calling them tributes and not taxes for reasons of suppressing rebellion, increased to 50 percent. The peasants were not even aware that the money had changed hands. They paid, still believing that it went to the Emperor.

Partial failure of crop was quite a regular occurrence in the Indian peasant’s life. That is why the surplus stock, which remained after paying the tributes, was so important to their livelihood. 

But with the increased taxation, this surplus deteriorated rapidly. When partial failure of crops came in 1768, this safety net was no longer in place. 

The rains of 1769 were dismal and herein the first signs of the terrible draught began to appear. The famine occurred mainly in the modern states of West Bengal and Bihar but also hit Orissa, Jharkhand and Bangladesh. 

Bengal was, of course, the worst hit. Among the worst affected areas were Birbum and Murshidabad in Bengal. Thousands depopulated the area in hopes of finding sustenance elsewhere, only to die of starvation later on. Those who stayed on perished nonetheless. Huge acres of farmland were abandoned. Wilderness started to thrive here, resulting in deep and inhabitable jungle areas. Tirhut, Champaran and Bettiah in Bihar were similarly affected in Bihar.

Prior to this, whenever the possibility of a famine had emerged, the Indian rulers would waive their taxes and see compensatory measures, such as irrigation, instituted to provide as much relief as possible to the stricken farmers. 

The colonial rulers continued to ignore any warnings that came their way regarding the famine, although starvation had set in from early 1770. Then the deaths started in 1771. 

That year, the company raised the land tax to 60 per cent in order to recompense themselves for the lost lives of so many peasants. Fewer peasants resulted in less crops that in turn meant less revenue. Hence the ones who did not yet succumb to the famine had to pay double the tax so as to ensure that the British treasury did not suffer any losses during this travesty.

After taking over from the Mughal rulers, the British had issued widespread orders for cash crops to be cultivated. These were intended to be exported. Thus farmers who were used to growing paddy and vegetables were now being forced to cultivate indigo, poppy and other such items that yielded a high market value for them but could be of no relief to a population starved of food. 

There was no backup of edible crops in case of a famine. The natural causes that had contributed to the draught were commonplace. 

It was the single minded motive for profit that wrought about the devastating consequences. 

No relief measure was provided for those affected. Rather, as mentioned above, taxation was increased to make up for any shortfall in revenue. What is more ironic is that the East India Company generated a profited higher in 1771 than they did in 1768.



Although the starved populace of Bengal did not know it yet, this was just the first of the umpteen famines, caused solely by the motive for profit, that was to slash across the country side. 

Although all these massacres were deadly in their own right, the deadliest one to occur after 1771 was in 1943 when three million people died and others resorted to eating grass and human flesh in order to survive.

Winston Churchill, the hallowed British War prime minister who saved Europe from a monster like Hitler was disturbingly callous about the roaring famine that was swallowing Bengal’s population. 

He casually diverted the supplies of medical aid and food that was being dispatched to the starving victims to the already well supplied soldiers of Europe. 

When entreated upon he said, “Famine or no famine, Indians will breed like rabbits.” The Delhi Government sent a telegram painting to him a picture of the horrible devastation and the number of people who had died. His only response was, “Then why hasn’t Gandhi died yet?”Winston Churchill



This Independence Day it is worthwhile to remember that the riches of the west were built on the graves of the East. 

While we honour the brave freedom fighters (as we should), it is victims like these, the ones sacrificed without a moment’s thought, who paid the ultimate price. 

Shed a tear in their memory and strive to make the most of this hard won independence that we take for granted today. Pledge to stand up those whose voice the world refuses to hear because they are too lowly to matter. To be free is a great privilege. But as a great superhero once said, “With great freedom comes great responsibility.”



Thursday, 11 February 2016

Write-offs a scam, small loans rarely in it, says former RBI Deputy Governor

Write-offs a scam, small loans rarely in it, says former RBI Deputy Governor
According to a former government official, some banks write off accounts to sell them to asset reconstruction companies (ARCs) at lower prices and make easy money out of it. (Reuters)


Former Reserve Bank Deputy Governor Dr K C Chakrabarty says technical write-offs by banks is a “scam” and should be stopped.

“Technical write-offs by Indian banks are inequitable and should be stopped. It is a big scam. Small loans are rarely written off, most of them are big loans,” London-based Chakrabarty, who handled the supervision department of the RBI from 2009 to 2014, told The Indian Express.

Public sector banks have written off Rs 1,14,000 crore in the last three years, as reported in The Indian Express on February 8, based on a response by the Reserve Bank of India to an RTI application.

Banks are planning to write off more bad loans in the current year, and this could be Rs 52,227 crore, similar to the quantum written off in 2014-15.

There’s a reason for the eagerness on the part of banks to write off loans though a loan is technically the bank’s asset. “It benefits banks in terms of tax liability,” M Narendra, former chairman and MD of Indian Overseas Bank, said. The other benefit is that the bad loan no longer stays in the bank’s books.

The write-off instruction comes from the head office.

“Technical or prudential write-off is the amount of non-performing loans which are outstanding in the books of the branches, but have been written off (fully or partially) at the head office level. Amount of technical write-off should be certified by statutory auditors,” says the RBI’s master circular on income recognition and asset classification.

“Banks should either make full provision as per the guidelines or write­ off such advances and claim such tax benefits as are applicable, by evolving appropriate methodology in consultation with their auditors/tax consultants. Recoveries made in such accounts should be offered for tax purposes as per rules,” the RBI says.

Narendra said, “Write-off happens when a loan becomes non-recoverable or dead asset. It’s done after making 100 per cent provisioning. The bank continues its recovery measures even after the write-off.”

Non-performing assets (NPAs) reflect poorly on the bank and they are eager to write it off or remove it from the balance sheet and reduce the tax liability.

According to a former government official, some banks write off accounts to sell them to asset reconstruction companies (ARCs) at lower prices and make easy money out of it. Banks don’t want to take on the tedious recovery process. Selling the assets to ARCs is a quick-fix solution for banks. “In some cases, bank officials cut sweet deals with the promoter of defaulting companies to write off loans,” the official said.

“There’s lack of vision to manage the NPA accounts among bank managements. There’s also lack of direction on the part of the Reserve Bank. What’s happening in PSU banks doesn’t get noticed. The attitude of borrowers is also changing on the issue of repayment. Many of them inflate the cost of the project. Valuers empanelled with the banks also go by that valuation,” Ramnath Pradeep, former chairman and MD of Corporation Bank, said. “I have seen some of the banks in a consortium writing off loans while others don’t do it. There’s no uniformity in their approach.”

If it is the head office of a bank that approves write-offs, loans are sanctioned by a credit approval committee comprising the chairman, executive directors and the general managers of a bank. This mechanism was put in place through a 2012 directive by the Finance Ministry. These committees can approve credit proposals up to Rs 400 crore in the case of Category A banks and Rs 250 crore in the case of other PSU banks. If the loan proposal is above this limit, it has to be vetted by the board committee. Often, the board clears the proposal put across by the management without much discussion. Small PSU banks blindly follow the decisions of bigger banks without going for any due diligence on their own, a government source said.

Boards of public sector banks have senior officials from the government as well as the RBI on their boards. “The irony of NPAs of PSU banks is that they have happened right under the nose of RBI officers who are on the boards of PSU banks. Thus, in a way the RBI becomes directly responsible for the banks’ decisions on credits that became NPAs,” K K Srinivasan, former Member (Life) of the Insurance Regulatory Development Authority of India, said.

For instance, Financial Services Secretary Anjuly Chib Duggal and Reserve Bank Deputy Governor Dr Urjit R Patel are on the SBI board. Rajesh Aggarwal, Joint Secretary in the Department of Financial Services, is a Director on the board of Punjab National Bank. B P Kanungo, who was Regional Director of the RBI in Kolkata, is also on the board of PNB.

In Bank of India, Anna Roy, Joint Secretary in the Department of Financial Services, is the government nominee while S S Barik, Regional Director of RBI, North Eastern States, is the RBI nominee on the board. Alok Pande, Director in the Department of Financial Services, and Nirmal Chand, Regional Director of RBI, Thiruvananthapuram, are on the board of Indian Overseas Bank.

“A regulator should not be a part of the apex business decision-making body (board of directors) of regulated entities. This position needs to be rectified if the RBI is to be absolved of the responsibility of NPAs of PSU banks,” Srinivasan said. This will require the RBI to withdraw its nominees from 27 PSU bank boards.
Copyright © 2016 - The Indian Express ltd. All Rights Reserved
http://www.financialexpress.com/article/industry/banking-finance/write-offs-a-scam-small-loans-rarely-in-it-says-former-rbi-deputy-governor/209882/

Friday, 22 January 2016

What really happened at Vasan Healthcare?

What really happened at Vasan Healthcare?

The inside story of how Vasan Healthcare, once a prized unicorn, valued at more than $1 billion, imploded

Ashish K. MishraS. Bridget Leena
http://www.livemint.com/Companies/0XHIPMIRMI5BeUMeZQEhoN/What-really-happened-at-Vasan-Healthcare.html
A
file photo a Vasan eye care centre in Delhi. Photo: Bloomberg


Mumbai/Chennai: At half-past seven on the morning of 1 December 2015, two cars pulled up outside 199, St Mary’s Road, in Alwarpet, a South Chennai neighbourhood that still has a few bungalows in what is increasingly becoming a city of apartments.

A man alighted from one of the cars and told the guard at 199, itself a bungalow, that he and his colleagues were from the income-tax (I-T) department. The guard, obviously flustered—a visit from the taxman isn’t a daily affair, and definitely not in St Mary’s Road—alerted the inmates of the house over the intercom and let the tax officials in.

The house belonged to A.M. Arun, founder of Vasan Healthcare Pvt. Ltd, one of India’s best known eyecare hospital chains.

Arun’s son, Yudish, 18, opened the door, as his father walked down the stairs from the first floor.

“Dr. Arun, we are from the income-tax office,” said a man flashing his ID card.

“Fine sir,” said Arun, 47, who has the habit of calling almost everyone sir.

“We have come for a search operation.”

“Fine sir. We will cooperate.”

In all, 10 officials entered the bungalow, men and women. And they began looking—for cash, jewellery, land records, property holdings, bank documents or any incriminating document that would suggest suppressed or undisclosed income. For the next 10 hours, the officers searched and took copious notes, picking up documents every once in a while and asking questions. They looked everywhere—inside the cupboards, inside suitcases, under the bed, feeling the inside of mattresses, in the kitchen cabinets… everywhere—turning the house upside down.

At 10am, another joint team of seven I-T and directorate of enforcement officials landed up at Vasan Healthcare’s office in Mylapore, Chennai. They stayed longer—one-and-a-half days.

The news spread fast. Almost everyone started connecting the dots like they always do, eager to unearth conspiracies that may or may not exist—friendship with a politician, black money, tax evasion, unlawful gains.

After all, Vasan Healthcare had imploded—losses, a mountain of debt, court cases to wind up the company and pending dues to suppliers.

The issue had been simmering for a while. Allegations had been aired of Arun’s closeness to Karti Chidambaram, son of former Union minister of finance P. Chidambaram. Of Karti having used Vasan Healthcare to launder black money.

A few months before the raid, in September, in a series of articles in The New Indian Express, S Gurumurthy, a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh ideologue and Chennai-based chartered accountant, alleged that Chidambaram received black money through Vasan, which he and his son owned through front companies, specifically Advantage Strategic Consulting Pvt. Ltd (more on this later). In August, a notice from the I-T department had arrived at Arun’s father-in-law V. Dwarakanathan’s house and another at Vasan’s headquarters.
A.M. Arun, founder of Vasan Healthcare. Photo: Sharp Image/Mint




Chidambaram issued a statement of denial in response to the allegations.

He said: “Let me say clearly that the entire report is false, malicious and part of a political campaign against members of the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government or individuals belonging to the Congress party.

“Neither I, my son nor any member of my family have any equity or investment or economic interest in the company concerned.”

He added: “I would like to say through this statement that the media must be responsible and truthful. Carrying false and malicious reports without independent verification will certainly attract the provisions of law and I shall not hesitate to place the matter in the hands of my lawyers to take appropriate action under law.”

And then came the December operation by the tax department which Chidambaram described as a “malicious onslaught” by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government at the centre.

In Chennai, talk about the raids ranged from the generous, “Arun may have done it” to the harsh, ‘Of course, he is guilty”.

What actually happened at Vasan is an extraordinary story. This is that story. Of how Vasan Healthcare, once a unicorn and darling of the healthcare industry, a jewel in the crown of marquee venture capital (VC) funds Sequoia Capital India Advisors Pvt. Ltd and GIC Pte. Ltd (formerly Government of Singapore Investment Corporation) fell from grace.

This is the story of a company’s lust for growth and valuation, which took precedence over any sort of financial discipline—all of it exacerbated by a board that allowed the problems to fester for years. This is the story of an entrepreneur who micromanaged everything. It is also the story of collateral damage when entrepreneurs cosy up to politicians and, when the tide runs out, are caught in the cross fire of political vendetta.


Alagappan, who was on Vasan’s board till August 2015, had first cautioned Arun to stop at 125 centres. Photo: Sharp Image/Mint



Above all, this is a cautionary tale.

This story is based on several accounts from people who have known Arun, or have been associated with Vasan. A few agreed to speak on record, including Arun himself and M.A. Alagappan, former executive chairman of the Murugappa Group, who was on the board of Vasan till August 2015. But many requested not to be identified, considering the I-T and directorate of enforcement investigation into the company’s affairs.

Mint reached out to Karti Chidambaram. In a text message he said: “I have no comments to make on speculations. I am neither a shareholder nor a director of the company.”

Even as Arun’s troubles with the I-T department started, he kept his investors, both Sequoia and GIC, in the dark.

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The worst is behind us now, says Vasan Eye Care’s AM Arun

In an emailed response to a detailed set of questions, Sequoia said: “Sequoia Capital India has been closely following recent developments regarding Vasan Healthcare. These developments include allegations of wrongdoing by Vasan Healthcare and a related governmental investigation. Investment funds associated with Sequoia Capital India hold a minority interest in Vasan Healthcare and have always advocated that Vasan Healthcare operate entirely within the law. 

Previously, VT Bharadwaj, a Managing Director of Sequoia Capital India Advisors Private Limited, served as Sequoia Capital India’s designee on the Vasan Healthcare Board of Directors. During his tenure on the Board, he demanded that management of Vasan Healthcare conduct a thorough investigation into the allegations. 

Sequoia Capital India fully supports the related governmental investigation, has adopted a policy of full compliance with that investigation, and has dutifully responded to governmental inquiries received to date.”




Bharadwaj resigned from the board of Vasan in November last year. In a strongly worded letter, he chided Arun for not keeping the investors in the loop when the company received summons, for significant delays in filing the company’s audited financials and for failure to clear its dues with vendors, among several issues. “The conduct of the company and the concerned officials in handling this issue clearly lacked in meeting the requisite corporate governance norms,” he said. Mint has seen a copy of the letter sent on 18 November.

GIC did not respond to a detailed questionnaire sent on 6 January. Arjun Gupta, head of portfolio and head of consumer and healthcare at GIC, did not respond to an e-mail sent to him. Gupta resigned from the Vasan’s board in November. Highlighting similar issues as Bharadwaj did, Gupta wrote in his resignation letter: “My well-earned reputation in the market developed with a lot of hard work and commitment on my part, has been put at risk by the Company and I have been exposed to unwanted letters/ communications from third parties and press in the capacity of a director of the Company.” Mint has seen a copy of the letter sent on 23 November.

To understand the Vasan story, one has to travel back in time to 2008, when Sequoia discovered a tiny bootstrapped start-up in Trichy, led by a gregarious, grassroots entrepreneur.





The McDonald’s of healthcare

The business case for an eyecare hospital is excellent. All human beings need to take good, proper care of their eyes. With age, more so. Be it surgery for cataracts or eye diseases, eyesight correction or plain vanilla spectacles, vision is of paramount importance. A World Health Organization report published in 2012 stated that India has an estimated 12 million blind people and an additional 456 million people who require vision correction. In 2008, single specialty healthcare in India was estimated to be an $80 billion market. Almost all of it virgin territory, thanks to the lack of public or private hospitals.

Except, Vasan Healthcare was in the thick of it.

How it got there can only be called an example of serendipity. In its earlier avatar, Vasan ran pharmacies and multi-specialty centres where it conducted lab tests, such as ultrasound and endoscopy. Businesses which Arun dabbled in after inheriting a chain of pharmacy stores from his father A. Murugiah, who died when Arun was just 19 years old, in 1988.

Vasan started out as Vasan Medical Hall, a pharmacy store, in 1947 in Trichy. In 2002, the company entered into a technical collaboration with Dr. Agarwal’s Eye Hospital, a renowned eye clinic in Chennai that was set up in 1994. The collaboration resulted in an eyecare hospital in Trichy. Soon enough though, Arun figured that it was the eyecare business that excited him the most and the one with the brighter future. So he started expanding it, opening more centres.

In the next six years, Vasan set up seven new centres. In March 2007, the company entered Chennai, the home turf of Dr. Agarwal, by acquiring Prem’s Eye Clinic (a premier eye clinic) for Rs.3.5 crore. 

Arun convinced K. Premraj, the founder of Prem’s Eye Clinic, to come on board as chief mentor. He did. By March 2008, Vasan had clocked revenue of Rs.45 crore, with a network of 14 centres, almost all of them in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. That’s when Sequoia Capital came calling.

The VC firm was impressed.

Existing eyecare use case: check.

Daycare model, with low capital investment, no need for beds and lavish infrastructure: check.

Non-real estate model: check.

High margin in eye surgeries: check.

High margin in selling spectacles and lens: check.

Good doctors such as Premraj: check.

Bootstrapped start-up: check.

Grassroots entrepreneur with a real back story: check.

What was not to like?

Eyecare hospitals are of three types—tertiary (large centre, takes about Rs.8-10 crore to set up), secondary (medium sized centre, takes about Rs.4-5 crore to set up) and primary (small centre, takes about Rs.1-3 crore to set up). All centres can do cataract operations. All of them sell spectacles and lenses, the so-called optical business. Complicated surgeries go to secondary and tertiary centres. Margins on the smallest to the most difficult surgeries and the optical business is anywhere between 30% and 50%.
Sequoia’s Bharadwaj, in a letter sent on 18 November 2015, chided Arun for not keeping investors in the loop.


A simple cataract operation on one eye costs about Rs.18,000. Purely at an Ebitda (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) level, a hospital can make about Rs.5,000 per eye for a surgery. 

For 10 cataract surgeries, every day of the year, for one eye: Rs.1.8 crore. For 50 surgeries every day of the year, for one eye: Rs.9.1 crore. Bottom-line: 50 patients walking into an eyecare hospital every day is a good number.

In September 2008, Sequoia initiated due diligence. It brought in Grant Thornton to audit the books, Amarchand Mangaldas for legal and Ernst & Young for commercial diligence. At the same time, it commissioned a consumer survey to understand the demand for eyecare and Vasan’s perception in the market.

As part of the exercise, Sequoia also carried out a KYC (know your customer) check on large shareholders in Vasan. 

The name Advantage Strategic Consulting Pvt. Ltd cropped up—promoted by an individual named Chinnabala Nageswara Reddy and two other directors (Ravi Visvanathan and Padma Visvanathan), the firm held a 5% stake in the company. Their association with Vasan went back a few years to when Arun was running the pharmacy business.

No red flags were raised. Everything checked out fine; Sequoia was excited by the business model and the entrepreneur. After due diligence, which lasted about four months, in February 2009, the firm invested Rs.50 crore in Vasan Healthcare. Sequoia’s Bharadwaj was named to the board.

Inside Vasan, the mood was jubilant. While ambitious, Arun, even in his wildest dreams, hadn’t fathomed that a marquee VC firm like Sequoia would invest in his company. With Rs.50 crore on the table, he now started dreaming big. The top team at Vasan went on an off-site to Yercaud, a hill station in Tamil Nadu, to strategize and plan. There, they decided to expand to 100 centres by 2015. We can do this, was the conclusion. Let’s build the McDonald’s of healthcare in India.

Whatever could go wrong? Part 1

With every centre that Vasan added, Sequoia’s appetite for the company grew. In 2009 alone, the company grew at a frenetic pace to add 28 new centres. It expanded to Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka and started going deeper in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. In February 2010, WestBridge Capital India Advisors Pvt. Ltd (formerly part of Sequoia) invested Rs.50 crore in Vasan. K.P. Balaraj of WestBridge was named to the board.

By March 2010, Vasan’s revenue grew to Rs.158 crore (compared with Rs.95 crore in March 2009). The company recorded a handsome Ebitda of Rs.54 crore. Profit after tax (PAT) was Rs.25.6 crore.

A few months later, in October 2010, Sequoia reached out to Advantage Strategic Consulting Pvt. Ltd to buy out its equity stake in the company. Advantage wasn’t interested. After a few rounds of negotiations, Advantage sold a partial stake (30,000 of the 150,000 shares it held in the company) to Sequoia at Rs.7,500 per share—a significant premium, considering that Advantage had acquired the shares atRs.100 each.

Vasan was doing well. Unlike other eyecare hospitals, it helped that Vasan invested in marketing, most importantly a sustained television campaign. Patients started flocking to its centres. 

For instance, on the first day that Vasan opened a centre in Ramanathapuram (Tamil Nadu) and Thalassery (Kerala), more than 100 patients showed up. People had heard of Vasan from their relatives in the big cities, or seen the TV ads. 

Centres in Dindigul and Ramanathapuram in Tamil Nadu and Thalassery in Kerala reached Ebitda break-even in just two months of opening. It was a similar story for the other centres, most of them registering an Ebitda break-even in less than a year.

For Arun, this was a significant validation of his business model. It is another matter altogether that instead of being content, he started fretting.

That’s because 2010 was the year that VC firms discovered the theme and potential of single specialty hospitals. So they started putting money in eyecare. 

New Delhi-based Centre for Sight raised funding from Matrix Partners. Eye-Q Vision received funding from Helion Venture Partners and Nexus Venture Partners. Watching from the sidelines, Arun was concerned that if he left the North India territory open for competitors, it would be a setback for Vasan. He wanted to grow and go after his competitors.

At the time, it seemed like the right thing to do, because Vasan’s aggressive growth had played out well. In March 2011, Vasan’s revenue doubled to Rs.310 crore. Ebitda, too, grew 2X to Rs.96 crore. PAT was Rs.37 crore. 

Arun also strengthened the composition of the board of the company by bringing in Alagappan. Alagappan picked up a small stake by investing Rs.2 crore and was happy to be Arun’s sounding board.

In Arun’s mind, the logic for expanding to the rest of the country was simple. Once a Vasan centre was opened, patients would come. The network would grow. The brand would grow. The revenue would grow. And valuation would increase and everyone would make money.

What could go wrong? he reasoned.

The investment from WestBridge and the company’s Ebitda only increased Arun’s confidence. The target of 100 centres was within reach. He wanted to get there as quickly as possible. In October 2011, Vasan entered east India, opening two flagship centres at Salt Lake City and Howrah in Kolkata.

On the day of inauguration of the branch at Salt Lake City, all of three patients walked in.

Vasan started advertising in newspapers: “Doctors from Chennai are coming to your city”. The number went up for a few days and then dwindled. The company invested in marketing once again. Another round of TV campaigns were aired. Real patients, real stories. “I am happy with Vasan.”

Even as all this was happening, Arun and the existing investors started wondering if the theme of single specialty hospitals would play out in other fields, such as dentistry. Arun and Premraj took it upon themselves to prove that it would. Almost immediately, a plan was drawn up to open Vasan dental hospitals. Not one but 11 of them. And so, even as Vasan was entering new territories, it entered a completely different line of business.

But there was only so much cash available. To bridge the shortage in capital, Vasan started borrowing—mostly short-term loans from banks and non-banking financial institutions. For every loan, Arun pledged his properties as collateral. In his mind, he was confident of coming good on the repayment, thanks to the quick Ebitda break-even of his new centres.

As 2011 was drawing to a close, the mood inside Vasan was celebratory. At its corporate headquarters, a cake was cut for the opening of every new centre. On 26 December 2011, the then Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, inaugurated Vasan’s 100th eyecare centre at Karaikudi in Tamil Nadu.

Doctors from Chennai travelled to every new centre to conduct the first surgery. Arun himself would be on calls with his operations team in the field almost all the time, working late into the night. It was around this time that Vasan found interest from another marquee investor.

Enter GIC.

Whatever could go wrong? Part II

By March 2012, Vasan had grown into a giant in the eyecare business. That year, it recorded revenue of Rs.451 crore, Ebitda of Rs.79 crore, and PAT of Rs.9.5 crore. That was 4X growth in revenue in just three years. It had a network of 103 eye hospitals and 27 dental centres.

GIC was excited to come on board. And it wanted to invest $100 million (aroundRs.500 crore then). Not a penny less.

Vasan went to town with the news. The press lapped up the story. At the time, $100 million was the largest private equity investment in healthcare. Arun and Vasan Healthcare became the toast of the town. After one interaction with Arun, Michael Moritz, the legendary investor and chairman of Sequoia Capital, called him “a tornado of energy”.

Less than 10% of GIC’s investment finally came into Vasan itself. Both Sequoia and Arun saw GIC’s investment as an opportunity to make some money. For themselves. Both did a secondary sale, selling their shares to GIC. No fresh shares were issued. Sequoia and Arun pocketed Rs.170 crore each. A few top officials and doctors, who had equity stock options, also cashed out. Of GIC’s Rs.500 crore investment, only Rs.90 crore made its way into Vasan. And Arjun Gupta of GIC was named to the board.

One explanation for this is that the board didn’t want to say no to GIC but also realized that Vasan didn’t need $100 million.

Arun’s appetite for growth now knew no bounds. He had a fascination for numerology—he wanted to open 11 new centers on 11 November 2011 (11/11/11). When that didn’t happen, he opened 11 new centres on 11 November 2012.

Life at the top at Vasan had become increasingly stressful. Premraj, who turned 60 and was in the habit of flying to every new centre to conduct the first surgery, started feeling that he was getting too old for that life. “My stomach was full,” he said. “I had worked for 35 years, my children were settled abroad, so when I turned 60, I could feel my age. My body couldn’t take the travel anymore, going to distant centres, staying there for four or five days, it was getting very tiring. So I decided to retire.”

Initially Arun resisted, asking Premraj to hang on for some time but in January 2013, Premraj moved to Coimbatore.

Meanwhile, Vasan kept growing. In the period between March 2012 and March 2013, the company added 40 new eyecare centres, expanding to Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat and Maharashtra. The company also went international, opening centres in West Asia (Dubai and Abu Dhabi) and Sri Lanka. By March 2013, Vasan had grown to a total of 170 centres. With very little equity capital at hand (and this is where the GIC investment would have helped, had it come to the company), Vasan was relying almost entirely on debt to fund the expansion. As of March 2013, Vasan’s debt ballooned to almost Rs.800 crore.

It was then that Alagappan cautioned Arun for the second time. He had first cautioned Arun to stop at 125 centres, but Arun had persisted. At 170, the board put its foot down. No more.

“I only wish Arun had taken my advice,” said Alagappan. “I first told him to stop at 125 but he didn’t adhere to my advice. I told him not to go abroad till the domestic market was settled because then everybody’s concentration in the company would be on the overseas markets. I’d seen that in my experience with companies. To a large extent he took my observations in this matter but as a first-generation entrepreneur, Arun saw the valuation and he wanted to grow further. I told him, at least stop at 148 but before I could say Jack, it went to 175.”

Even as all this was happening, investors started getting the feeling that Vasan had a much graver challenge than debt. Its centres in the north, east and west were taking a much longer time to break even. Quite a few had been around for a year and they were far from being Ebitda-profitable. The investors dug deeper and realized that most of the new centres had been built at a far higher cost compared with the centres in south India. The cost of rentals, cost of putting up the furniture and decor (standard Vasan look and feel) was far higher, even as fewer patients were coming in.

To make things worse, Vasan’s centres in south India, especially in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, had started cannibalizing each other.

The board took up the matter with Arun. Perhaps the market in south India was saturated, it told him. Too many players, too many centres. Arun’s response: far from it. Give it time. All centres will break even, it’s just a matter of some time, he argued.

As of March 2014, Vasan’s revenue grew to Rs.728 crore. Ebitda was Rs.131 crore. But the company made a loss of Rs.50.3 crore. And it had debt of Rs.1,200 crore.

It had 200 centres.

The alarm bells were going off.

‘I made a mistake’

It is 11 January 2016. We’ve been waiting for Arun for over two hours now at Vasan Healthcare’s corporate office in Chennai. As the hours have passed, we’ve moved—in sync with his schedule of arrival—from the reception to inside the office to outside the chairman’s cabin and finally at around 7:30pm, inside the chairman’s office.

The room is freezing, white and has a curious decor combining contemporary furniture and gods and goddesses.

There are Stanley white leather sofas at one end, a Bang & Olufsen television hanging from the ceiling above it and a Piguet wall clock next to it. Bang opposite the sofa is the chairman’s large working table. On it are several random knick-knacks, pens, paper notes, a Montblanc watch, a Mac desktop on the left and two stacks of business and leisure magazines on the far right. Just behind the chairman’s chair, the wall is adorned with pictures of all sorts and forms of gods and goddesses—Shiva, Lakshmi, Ganesha, Murugan, Shirdi Sai Baba and many more. On the right is a bookcase filled with books : Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, Barack Obama’s Dreams From My Father, Jugaad Innovation, The Secret to Winning Big, Unlimited Power, Winning by Jack Welch,Business @ The Speed of Thought by Bill Gates, The Pocket Oxford English Dictionary, Good to Great by Jim Collins and several others.

At 7:40pm, Arun walks in. He is dressed in a white shirt, beige corduroy trousers and brown loafers.

White is a colour the man likes. He usually wears white shirts and white trousers.

“Sorry, I’m late. There was just too much traffic. I was thinking of going home but then I knew you would be waiting. So I came here just for you.”

No. No problem. Not at all. Thanks for taking the time.

“Have you had something to eat? Drink?”

Yeah. We had coffee.

(Rings a bell. His assistant comes in.)

“Coffee? Tea? Juice, you want juice? Garlic bread? Yes. Get them some garlic bread.”

(The assistant leaves)

“Now, what story are you writing?”

What happened at Vasan? You know, it was a unicorn, valued at more than $1 billion and it all went wrong…

“See, nothing went wrong. There was a turbulence of cash flow. (It was a) temporary issue. I made a mistake. But anybody can make a mistake. We expanded rapidly. In 2012, we were in four states with 100 centres. In 2014, we were in 19 states with 200 centres. There was expansion and cash loss; how can you sustain the business? How can you support 200 centres? I don’t mean to say this but even God cannot create what we did in such a short time.”

Whatever could go wrong? Part III

By mid-2014, it was clear that Vasan needed intervention. At Rs.1,200 crore, the debt was too high. It had started affecting the company. So much so that Arun was spending almost all his time juggling finances and fire-fighting on repayments. In May 2014, the board decided to do something about it and arrived at a decision to go for a rights issue. Arun put in Rs.170 crore, Sequoia Rs.80 crore and GIC Rs.100 crore. Vasan Healthcare was valued at Rs.3,000 crore.

The investors had a simple plan in mind. Along with Arun, they would take the money and sit across the table with Corporation Bank and retire a huge loan ofRs.180 crore. In return, Corporation Bank would release a clutch of Arun’s property (worth Rs.150-odd crore), which it had held as collateral. Arun would then sell the property and invest the money back in Vasan. Simple enough.

What actually happened is this. Corporation Bank said no. Vasan had a working capital loan running with the bank, so just to be sure that everything was in order, the bank would continue to hold the property as collateral.

Even as all this was happening, Vasan started getting suitors from the healthcare sector across the world—specifically Malaysian conglomerate Sime Darby Group and South African hospital chain Netcare. Both were interested in picking up a large stake in Vasan, valuing the company at more than $1 billion. To the tune of almost Rs.7,000 crore. A unicorn. Newspapers caught a whiff of the deal and started reporting on the impending transaction. The Economic Times reported on 28 July 2014, quoting people with knowledge of the matter, that around 51% would be sold, with the promoter also selling a part of his stake. Talks progressed, especially with Netcare, but then it all came to a standstill on a simple point.

There was no balance sheet.

What are the numbers? And where are they?

This is at the crux of Vasan’s implosion. Vasan grew from 14 to 200 centres in just three years of operations, but there were no financial controls. At the board level, there was no concept of plans, budgets and approvals. Whatever Arun would present would sail through. If not, he would cajole his way through. If there was a variance in the amount that had been spent, no red flags were raised. The board believed that Vasan was a growth company, a start-up, and convinced itself that adding controls would hinder growth. Their logic: after all, it is a promoter-driven company.

In its simplest form, what is financial control? It is delegation of decision making to spend money and be accountable for it if something goes awry. 

At Vasan, there was only one person who called the shots—Arun. In the three years of unhindered growth, he micro-managed everything, from operations to finance to marketing. That level of micro-management reflected in the organization. In three years, Vasan had failed to implement SAP, or Systems Applications Products, an enterprise software system. 

There was too much cash floating in the system—sometimes dues to vendors and doctors were settled in cash. To add to it, Vasan had failed to deposit with the government tax deducted at source (TDS) of Rs.19.22 crore that it had deducted from the salaries of its employees in 2012.

And then there was the far bigger problem of Arun—whenever he was running short of money, he would borrow and put it in the company.

“There were a lot of transactions between Arun and the company,” said Alagappan. “He had invested a lot of his own money. He was borrowing outside and putting it in the company. Then money was going back to him, going in dribs and drabs. That is why getting the balance sheet out took time. The auditors became much more cagey. If he had got the balance sheet out on time then the current problem would not have arisen.”

In the second half of 2014, board meetings of Vasan became infrequent and moved from the company’s headquarters to the Taj hotel. In the meetings, it was evident that Arun’s entire focus was on making repayments for loans, juggling supplier payments, re-negotiating loans and getting the balance sheet out. The more time it took, the more jittery investors became. By the end of 2014, it became clear that there would be no external investment.

Almost everyone could see the writing on the wall. Vasan was headed for a free fall.

What’s bad must only get worse

As 2015 began, Vasan was taken to court on its TDS default. For about a month, its bank accounts were frozen. Cheques that the company had issued to vendors bounced. Everybody was spooked and started reaching out to the company. First, the emails went unanswered. Then the calls were ignored. Finally, left with no option, suppliers and landlords started dropping by at Vasan’s headquarters to collect their dues. 

When Arun was not reachable—and he was never available in early 2015—suppliers started calling the investors. From as little as Rs.25 lakhs toRs.200 crore, money was due to a lot of people—landlords, equipment manufacturers, those who had supplied frames and medicines.

At Vasan’s headquarters, a lucky few vendors got their money. Most others received empty assurances and post-dated cheques. A few thought of suing the company but then dropped the idea, considering the legal costs involved. Some did eventually take the company to court.

Even as all this was happening, a few mezzanine funds approached Vasan. They were attracted by the company’s Ebitda profits and mooted the idea of retiring the company’s debt in return for a 22-23% return on investment and a little equity. 

Arcus Capital was one of the funds that initiated due diligence for such a deal. It brought in Deloitte India to carry out a complete commercial audit. But yet again, this proved to be a non-starter.

A balance sheet is the first port of call for any investment and at Vasan, even till February 2015, there was no sign of the balance sheet for the year ended 31 March 2014.

By this time, Vasan had run out of options. Most banks in Chennai had already loaned it money. The company had retired more than Rs.400 crore of debt, thanks to the rights issue, but its debt was still too high. So were the dues to suppliers. It was only a matter of time before board members started resigning.

In Chennai, Vasan’s implosion became a subject of intense gossip. Whatever happened at Vasan?

In September 2015, Gurumurthy wrote a series of articles on Vasan in the New Indian Express, alleging that Vasan was actually a conduit for routing money to former finance minister Chidambaram and his family and that it was partly owned by Advantage Strategic Consulting Pvt. Ltd—which in turn was owned by Ausbridge Holdings and Investments Pvt. Ltd, a company where Karti Chidambaram was a director.

Mint looked into the antecedents of Advantage and Ausbridge. According to Registrar of Companies filings, on 25 March 2011, Ausbridge Holdings bought 200,000 shares (amounting to a 66% equity stake) in Advantage Strategic. According to a May 2012 report in the Economic Times on the business interests of Karti Chidambaram, he was a director at Ausbridge at the time. He is no more a director at the company and it is not known when he quit.

Advantage Strategic did not respond to an email with a detailed set of questions sent on 6 January. Ravi Visvanathan, the director of the company, declined to comment.

‘I have done no wrong’

We have been chatting with Arun for a while. It is past 8pm at Vasan’s office, which is now deserted except for Arun’s assistant and one supplier still waiting in the board room to negotiate payment of his dues. Arun is doing most of the talking.

He believes he can come out of the hole that, ironically, he himself dug.

The problem was caused by expansion, the funding of the expansion and a miscalculation on when the new centres would break even, he explained.

“In 2012 March, when GIC invested Rs.500 crore, the company was present only in south India, in four states. We had 103 clinics in four states. The revenue run rate per month when GIC invested was Rs.57 crore in four states. In 2013-14, in just two years, we added 100 clinics across 15 new states. Money was spent in marketing, capital expenses in putting the hospital, interest of the loans, repayment of term loans—you can’t do that by magic. Where there was a mismatch was we thought clinics would break even like south India. We had to fund the cash loss, fund the loans which we had taken for the older clinics and the newer ones.”

Things will get better, he promised.

He must believe that, because he has restarted coming to the office regularly.

“I have tasted all rough weather, have understood the strength of my business. We have learnt what to do, what not to do,” he says.

Among the dos, he rattles off financial reporting, governance, professional management system, building a team where the leaders can take decisions, people empowered to execute the passion of the founder.

Among the don’ts: no micro-managing. “If I do everything myself, it gets diluted. It becomes too many things, it doesn’t work.”

His plan is to downsize 35 centres, address the cash-flow mismatch, improve the quality of financial reporting, and get back on track. There’s still about Rs.450 crore of debt, Rs.140 crore due to suppliers (which don’t include Vasan’s past dues to two of its largest suppliers—Essilor and Alcon India. Right now, Vasan is working on a cash-and-carry arrangement with them, making weekly or monthly payments).

Then, there are the investigations by the tax department and the enforcement directorate. The investigation is on and Arun has been visiting the I-T office almost twice every week. When Mint reached out to an official at the I-T department, he refused comment on the status of the investigation.

Arun thinks he can handle these too. “I have done no wrong,” he says.

“Going forward I think I am in the best of my times.”

Tarun Shukla in New Delhi contributed to this story.


Ashish K. MishraS. Bridget Leena


http://www.livemint.com/Companies/0XHIPMIRMI5BeUMeZQEhoN/What-really-happened-at-Vasan-Healthcare.html

Tuesday, 22 December 2015

Why dal prices have doubled

Why dal prices have doubled


Where does a 12% decline translate as 100% increase? In the bizarre world of India's food math. Production of pulses slipped down by 12% in 2014-15 compared to the previous year. 

As a result, prices of this essential item have zoomed up by more than 100% across the country. The government is scrambling to retrieve the situation, especially because an important election is being fought in Bihar and the festive season is just beginning. It's a kind of an onion moment - where merciless spikes in onion prices in the past led to political upheavals.

But why are pulses on fire? Here are the basics: India consumes around 23 million metric tons (MMT) of pulses. This is an aggregate of a variety of pulses including gram (chana), tur or arhar, mung, masur and urad. Pulses are the main source of protein for a very large number of people in the country - each 100 grams contains about 32 grams of proteins and several amino acids not made by the body. So, it is an essential part of Indian meals. Naturally, India is the largest producer and consumer of pulses in the world.

But India's production of pulses has stagnated at around 18-19 MMT for several years now. The shortfall between production and consumption is made up by imports, mainly from Canada, Myanmar and some African countries.

This balance has been maintained at a huge cost to the people. A population growing at the rate of about 2% per year in the past decade should have quickly overtaken the pulses rate of growth which was less than half of that. This has not happened because the amount of pulses consumed per person has relentlessly declined over the past several decades. From about 61 grams per person per day in 1951 to about 42 grams in 2013.

This year the balance has been rudely and dramatically upset. In 2014-15, production of pulses was clocked in at 17.4 MMT - a decline of 2.4 MMT or 12% over the previous year. This was caused by various factors including unseasonal rains, pests, and unprofitable prices for offered to farmers even as import duties were waived.






This decline appears to have been seized as an opportunity to make a quick killing by traders - both domestic and global. There are reports of pulses stocks lying in warehouses at ports as traders wait it out and allow shortages to pump up prices even more. And, exporters in touch with producers from Canada (mainly lentil or masur), Myanmar (mainly tur) and Australia (mainly chickpeas or Kabuli chana) have hiked up the rates because India is the biggest player in the pulses import market.

So, in 2014-15, India has imported 4.6 MMT pulses, up 31% compared to the previous year. International prices have risen in tandem from Rs 32 per kg to Rs 50 for chana, from Rs 56 to Rs 75 for lentil, from Rs 40 to Rs 90 for tur, and from Rs 50 to Rs 77 for urad between October 2014 and August 2015 according to the latest agriculture ministry profile.

Saturday, 19 December 2015

RBI wants banks to quickly and effectively pass on the reduction in RBI's key rates time to time to the end-consumer, which hasn’t been happening so far.

New base rate regime is a firm message from Rajan to banks: No more tricks on common man

The message from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) with the latest revision in the base rate methodology is very clear.
The central bank, under Raghuram Rajan, doesn’t want banks to play hide and seek any more when it comes to the transmission of policy signals infirm the banking system. In other words, the RBI wants banks to quickly and effectively pass on the reduction in RBI's key rates time to time to the end-consumer, which hasn’t been happening so far.
Raghuram Rajan. PTI
Raghuram Rajan. PTI
The central bank has cut its key lending rate by 125 basis points (bps) so far but banks haven’t passed on beyond 60-70 basis points. One bps is one hundredth of a percentage point.
The base rate system was introduced in July 2010 replacing the erstwhile benchmark prime lending rate (BPLR). Before this, banks were lending almost 70 percent of their loans below BPLR that raised questions on the very relevance of this benchmark.
Under the base rate regime, banks were not allowed to lend below the base rate. That brought in more transparency but didn’t solve the problem of lack of monetary transmission in the banking system. Base rates still didn’t reflect the intended signals from the RBI on interest rates, since banks still found a way to manipulate the final lending rate.
The main reason for this was banks were using their average cost of funds. This created distortions since the longer maturity deposits did not easily reflect the changes at the short end and hence banks were unable to pass on RBI rate cuts to the borrower using the average cost system. This is one reason even those banks with lower deposit rates were unable to cut their lending rates to the extent which the RBI has. Also, different banks used different buckets of deposits to calculate base rate.
This is where the RBI has now acted. It has directed banks to switch to marginal cost of funds-based lending rate (MCLR) under which, banks will have to calculate their base rate based on their marginal cost of funds as the name suggests. Marginal cost is calculated based on the latest rate payable on the current and savings deposits. But the final lending rate will include other components of spread to MCLR, which include the tenor premium of the particular loan.
The central bank is hopeful that the new system would make the RBI rate signals a meaningful action for the end-borrower. It should. As per the RBI’s plan, banks will review their base rates according to the new methodology and publicise it frequently. While the new borrowers will certainly benefit from the lower rates, even the existing borrowers too will have the option to move to this new base rate regime at the time of resetting the loan.
Does this mean any significant relief for home and auto loan buyers? Not really. As Firstpost has highlighted before, the overall decline in the home/auto loan EMIs will be a few hundred rupees even if the base rate moves a quarter basis points lower. Also, so far banks have been playing with the spread above the actual base rate to arrive at the final lending rate. But later, the RBI insisted that banks need to have board-approved policy to decide the components of spread.
Nevertheless, the central bank has sent a strong signal to the industry to instil transparency in the system.
Constant nudging
In the last one year, the RBI has been trying hard to convince the banks to substantially pass on the benefit of lending rate cuts to the customer by nudging them, even listing the need for effective monetary transmission as a prerequisite for further rate cuts. Banks did pass on part of the lower rates but not significantly.
In fact, in April this year, Rajan came down heavily on banks for not lowering their lending rates despite the RBI cutting its key rate substantially, citing that cost of funds have come down and banks’ argument for not lowering rate is non-sense. “Banks are sitting on money," Rajan said. "Their marginal cost of funds has fallen. The notion that it hasn't fallen is nonsense."
To be sure, banks’ reluctance to cut their lending rates was also due the high share of bad loans in their books, poor demand from corporate borrowers and their inability to lower their deposit rates on account of stiff competition from small savings schemes offered by the government.
While bad loans and poor demand continue, the government has promised to bring down the rate of small savings schemes to enable banks pare their deposit rates. With all banks moving to marginal cost of funds to decide base rate, this shouldn’t be much of a problem now for not lowering lending rate.
Rajan has had a tough time convincing banks to cut their lending rates taking the central bank’s rate signals. While the earlier belief that market competition will eventually force banks to lower lending rates didn’t work well, the RBI has now moved to use its last remaining tools to force banks follow the suit.

Tuesday, 8 September 2015

Rajan: Analysts give 4.3 out of 5 to RBI governor




2 years of Rajan: Analysts give 4.3 out of 5 to RBI governor
By Kshitij Anand, ECONOMICTIMES.COM | 5 Sep, 2015, 01.38PM IST

NEW DELHI: Analysts and economists gave a thumbs-up to Raghuram Rajan as he completed two years as governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) on Friday. On a scale of 5, five analysts have given Rajan an average rating of 4.5.

Raghuram Govind Rajan took charge as the 23rd governor of Reserve Bank of India on September 4, 2013 with a three-year term. In his first two years in office, inflation has come down, interest rate has eased to 7.25 per cent from 8 per cent in 2014, the forex kitty has swelled and the rupee has become more resilient. Plus, there have been two rounds of new bank licence awards, including the birth of an entirely new breed of banks in the country.

The former IMF chief economist, who had famously predicted the 2008 financial crisis in 2005, has also overseen some key reforms in monetary policy management and in the administration of the central bank.

India has been among the best-performing emerging markets amid a global currency rout against the dollar as emerging markets witness a major capital flight not seen since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.

"Dr Rajan's two years in office has been extremely valuable for the Indian economy. He has been successful in containing CPI inflation, managing inflation expectations and regaining investor confidence. The governor has also brought about some important changes to the monetary policy framework," said Dr Arun Singh from Dun & Bradstreet.

"The measures taken to bring about a resolution of the rising pile of stressed assets in the banking system will show results in the years to come," he said.

In the last one year, under his tenure, RBI granted banking licences to infrastructure financing firm IDFC and microfinance institution Bandhan.

Last month, the central granted 'in-principle' approval to 11 entities, including Reliance Industries, Aditya Birla Nuvo, Paytm, Vodafone andAirtel to set up payments banks and proposed such licences 'on tap' in future.

The governor has also managed to steer the economy through some of the toughest times. Having taken over the reins at a time of highfiscal deficit, high inflation and a vulnerable currency, Rajan has managed to restore investor confidence in the monetary policy and brought stability to the banking system.

"Independence and credibility of the central bank has been reaffirmed and international investors have poured record amounts into the Indian fixed income market over the past two years," said Mihir Vora, Director and Chief Investment Officer, Max Life Insurance.

"The rupee has behaved well in recent turbulent times and inflationary expectations are rapidly coming down, which is not a mean feat to achieve," Vora said.



Important Developments:







Movement of BSE Bankex in Rajan's first two years:

The S&P BSE Banking has rallied over 68 per cent from 10,964.19 in September 2013 to 18,437.50 in this September.







Accolades from global fund managers

One of the reasons investors across the globe favour India is that RBI has avoided the mistakes of other central banks, which have lowered interest rates to stimulate growth. The new government's prudence in managing its finances has also helped.

"One of the advantages that India has other than having the lot of smarter people is that your central banker (Raghuram Rajan) is probably the best central banker in the world, or at least the least bad central bankers in the world," Jim Rogers of Rogers Holdings said in an interview with ET Now last month.

"I always admire what I read, when he says things. Unfortunately, he is not the Indian government. He cannot save India, but you certainly have the least bad central banker in the world and I hope he continues being like that," he said.

Raghuram Rajan took over the job two years ago at a time when the rupee was in a precarious state, but the new governor nursed it back to health.

In an interview with ET Now in August, Marc Faber said he did not trust central bankers except that of India's, since he has a solid grip on monetary policies, while other monetary authorities around the world were basically money printers.

"Mr Raghuram Rajan is an outstanding man who understands central banking. He is probably only one in the world among the crowds of professors at central banks that actually has a good grip on monetary policies and what you can or cannot achieve with them. He should get the Noble Prize in economics. Others are all money printers at heart, all of them," Faber said.

Outlook on interest rates:

With inflation easing, a rate cut is in the offing. However, it may not come soon considering the global conditions. A lower interest rate can effectively bring about a turnaround in investment and hence growth, say experts.

"Considering the current global conditions, Mr Rajan may continue to hold interest rates at current levels, because a fall in interest rates could trigger flight of capital from India and would put pressure on the rupee," said Tushar of Right Horizons Financial Services.

In August, the Reserve Bank of India kept interest rates unchanged as expected but raised hopes of a reduction before the end of the year if the monsoon maintains its 'near-normal' progress. Rajan reintroduced the phrase "accommodative stance of monetary policy" after having dropped it in the June review.

"In the near future, we are expecting no change or a very slight change (approx 25 bps) in interest rate amid poor monsoon conditions and inflation," says Rohit Gadia, Founder & CEO, CapitalVia Global Research.

Sandeep Nayak ED & CEO, Centrum Broking, is of the view that the interest rate bias is downward. He expects interest rates to come down by 25-50 bps this financial year.

Outlook on the rupee:

The US dollar gained significantly against most international currencies during the year, but depreciated against the US dollar. The currency volatility began from August 11, when China devalued its yuan by 3.5 per cent, collectively.

The rupee has lost about 3.5 per cent since them. Speculations are rife that the country, struggling for export competitiveness, would make its currency further weaker.

The rupee, however, depreciated only marginally against the US dollar; by that token, it gained strongly against other major currencies, viz., euro, British pound and Japanese yen, reflecting a weak economic outlook for these economies and their ultra-accommodative monetary policies.

"The rupee is under pressure and will continue to remain so. Relative to the fall in other currencies, the rupee is better-off due to a controlled current account deficit on the back of benign oil prices," says Sandeep Nayak, ED & CEO, Centrum Broking.

"The rupee should remain rangebound between Rs 65 and Rs 67 against the US dollar in the short term, but it is difficult to predict the range for the medium term," he added.

Nayak is of the view that interest rate-sensitive stocks are out of favour right now, but barring real estate, he sees interest returning to auto and selectively bank stocks from a medium-term perspective.

The rupee is expected to remain at current level till the end of the calendar year 2015, say experts. Rate-sensitive sectors such as infrastructure, metals and power could face the heat, which would further impact the performance of banks, because all of them have exposure to these industries.

The outlook for the manufacturing sector would not improve anytime soon on the back of cheaper imports from China and other emerging countries, where the local currencies have weakened significantly.

"I believe investors should choose businesses that could get benefits from the rupee depreciation - such as pharma and IT/ITeS. The rupee is expected to remain at current levels till the end of calendar year 2015," said Pendharkar of Right Horizons Financial Services.

"In addition, consumption businesses such as FMCG, paints, consumer durables and auto could be better investment options in the current scenario," he said.
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/2-years-of-rajan-analysts-give-4-3-out-of-5-to-rbi-governor/articleshow/48834479.cms?prtpage=1

PM Narendra Modi to meet top industry leaders on global economic scene




PM Narendra Modi to meet top industry leaders on global economic scene
By ET Bureau | 8 Sep, 2015, 06.26AM IST



PM Narendra Modi will tomorrow hold a wide-ranging discussion on global economic scenario with business leaders, including Reliance Industries head Mukesh Ambani, Tata Group Chairman Cyrus Mistry as well as bankers and economists.

NEW DELHI: PM Narendra Modi will interact with top Indian business tycoons such asMukesh Ambani, Cyrus Mistry, KM Birla and Sunil Mittal along with RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan, top bankers and leading economists on Tuesday in a rare meeting against the backcloth of plunging stock market indices, a weakening rupee and fears about global economic growth triggered by the China slump.

The meeting, the first time that such high-profile industry leaders are expected to sit across the table with the PM in the nearly 15 months he has been in charge, is expected to highlight India's relative attractiveness amid the growing global gloom and exhort the assembled corporate bosses to step up their investments.

Close to 40 people are expected to attend the closed-door meeting at the PM's Race Course Road residence in Delhi.


"The Prime Minister has regularly met top bosses of major global corporations and had also met industry chambers individually a couple of months ago," one official familiar with the matter said. However, this is the first time the PM is hosting a meeting of this kind, a normal practice during the Manmohan Singh era.

The meeting is being held at a time nervousness is rising whether India's incipient economic recovery could falter because of global factors, led by the Chinese slowdown and rising fears of a flight of capital from emerging markets, including India, in the event of a US interest rate increase.

Already, Indian stock market indices are near levels where they were when the Modi government took charge on May 26 last year.

Indian stocks tumbled to a 15-month low on Monday, with the benchmark Sensex slipping below the 25,000-point mark for the first time since June 2014, closing 308 points down at 24,893.81. The Sensex, which has fallen almost 11% since August 11, the day China first devalued its currency, is just 177 points away from its May 26 level.

The rupee hit a fresh two-year low against the dollar on Monday, closing 0.5% down at 66.82. It has fallen 4.6% since the yuan devaluation by China.

These are not the only causes for concern. Adding to the nervousness, India's GDP growth too slipped to 7% in the April-June quarter, down from 7.5% in the previous quarter, with analysts attributing the slippage in the growth clip to tepid investments by industry.

Gross fixed capital formation rose 4.9% in Q1FY16, a four-quarter high, but well below potential and with the gains mostly attributed to public investments. The private corporate sector, saddled with debt and excess capacity in many sectors, has been in a wait-andwatch mode for some time now, focusing more on balance sheet repair than fresh investments.

Officials said Tuesday's meeting, to be kicked off by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley and Chief Economic Advisor Arvind Subramanian, will focus on the opportunities the global economic turmoil could throw up for India.

"A wide-ranging discussion is expected on the impact of recent economic events, and how best India can take advantage of them," a government statement said, adding that the meeting will have more than 40 delegates, including cabinet ministers, top government and RBI officials, industry representatives, bankers, economists and sectoral experts.

"The PM is expected to speak after hearing out their views and ideas," said the official aware of the meeting that is expected to last a little over two hours.

CII President and Tractors India CMD Sumit Mazumder, Ficci President and CMD of Bharat Hotels Jyotsna Suri and Assocham President and YES Bank CEO Rana Kapoor would also be present at the meeting.

"The PMO wants to focus the discussion on what opportunities India could exploit and has sought perspectives and ideas from different players, including economists and financiers. We hope the government will take some of those ideas and implement them soon to spur the economy," Mazumder told ET.

The Modi government has not reconstituted the Prime Minister's Council on Trade and Industry that met regularly under the UPA government and included the who's who of India Inc. Towards the end of UPA's second tenure in office, India Inc had regularly used the forum to call for urgent reforms to salvage a slowing economy.

The NDA's victory at the 2014 Lok Sabha polls had been received with great enthusiasm by industry as it expected the Modi regime to take forward critical reforms that were left hanging by the Manmohan Singh government.











Prime Minister Narendra Modi asks industry to take risk, invest; India Inc wants rate cut
By Vikas Dhoot, ET Bureau | 8 Sep, 2015, 02.59PM IST
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Finance Minister Arun Jaitley expressed hope that it would by rolled out, Mazumder said, adding the land bill did not come up for discussion. 

NEW DELHI: Prime Minister Narendra Modi has asked India Inc to take risks and step up investments, saying India's improved macro-economic and fiscal indicators were a good backdrop for investments.

"While the government has a role to play, industry also has a role to play in demand creation for investments," the prime minister said after a nearly three-hour meeting with top industrialists, financiers and bankers.

"The PM has adopted a hands-on approach with the economy to ensure that the momentum picks up before it's too late," said one of the industry captains who attended the meeting.

Modi and Finance Minister Arun Jaitley were listening for most of that time, with a dozen top government officials studiously taking notes on the ideas and concerns raised by industry captains that would be examined for further action.

The stalled reforms to the land acquisition law, a persistent dampener for industry, was only alluded to through a reference to 'political opposition', but Jaitley is learnt to have exuded confidence that the Goods and Services Tax regime will be introduced "sooner rather than later".

"The prime minister and FM virtually advised secretaries and top officials to work towards improvements in the areas of concern flagged by each industrialist. The government has signalled the strong will to improve the regulatory landscape so that there's a genuine rebound in investments and the economy," said Yes Bank CEO Rana Kapoor.

"The PM was emphatic that risk-related entrepreneurship should not be subdued, but catalyzed. A lot of new investments could be made in soft infrastructure like affordable housing, hospitals as well as hard infrastructure like roads and highways," Kapoor said.

CII president Sumit Mazumder said the government made the point that India is relatively insulated from the China crisis, which is likely to re-appear. "We pointed out that though the government has done a lot to improve the ease of doing business, a lot more needs to be done," he said.

In fact, the ease of doing business, the problems faced by stalled projects, stressed corporate and bank balance sheets were recurrent concerns raised by most industrialists present.

The stock market see-sawed in the first couple of hours of trading on Tuesday, but picked up steam and was over 400 points higher by 3 pm.

The prime minister was keen on using the Mudra Bank to catalyse small and medium enterprises and urged industry leaders to adopt innovation clusters and focus on innovation, skill development and entrepreneurship initiatives. He spelt out the need to re-orient programmes like the MGNREGA towards skill-oriented spending, so that people have a permanent employable skill.

Chief Economic Advisor Arvind Subramanian made a strong case that India is in a relatively good place amid the current global economic turmoil and the 'base case for growth is now very clear,' said industry officials present at the meeting.

Minister of State for Finance Jayant Sinha, Railway Minister Suresh Prabhu, Road Transport and Shipping Minister Nitin Gadkari and ministers of state holding independent charge — Nirmala Sitharaman (commerce and industry), Dharmendra Pradhan (petroleum and natural gas) and Piyush Goyal (power, coal and renewable energy) were also present at the meeting.

Reliance Industries' chairman and managing director Mukesh Ambani, Aditya Birla Group head Kumar Mangalam Birla, Adani group chairman Gautam Adani and Tata group chief Cyrus Mistry attended the meeting along with Wipro boss Azim Premji, Sun Pharma CMD Dilip Sanghvi, ITC's YC Deveshwar, IL&FS chairman Ravi Parthasarathy and TVS Capital's Gopal Srinivasan.

Eight economists, 14 industry representatives and four top financiers, including SBI chief Arundhati Bhattacharya, ICICI Bank's Chanda Kochar, IDFC's Rajiv Lall and CEO of the recently-launched Bandhan Bank Chandra Shekhar Ghosh, were also present.
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